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Abstract
This thesis explores the interlinking of evaluation and development through an anthropological
lens by considering the indigenization process of an evaluation culture, and how evaluation travels
across boundaries as an assemblage, similar to many other global phenomena. Central to the thesis
is the national evaluation capacity building trend viewed as a two-sided project; first as internal
capacity building of institutions and organizations while facilitating a professionalization of
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) through national evaluation associations. Second, as promoting
civil society-led evaluation of government-implemented development policy. In this second part, a
community monitoring and evaluation project organized by Zambia’s civil society network CSPR
is examined as a strategy for social accountability and pro-poor development. The conclusions
demonstrate that the current evaluation capacity building trend cannot be differentiated from the
existing evaluation culture in Western societies and the current values of the new aid regime. The
methodology relies on interview data from a field study conducted in Lusaka and Choma in
Zambia, as well as documents and reports that were collected in the field. The data analysis was
conducted using a qualitative data analysis software which is also discussed in brief.
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21. Introduction
One of the most recent exports to many developing countries is neither a fast food chain nor a
trade liberalization policy, but it is being marketed as essential to progress.
In the public sector there is the “New Public Management” trend of how things are supposed to
run in public administration. In our private lives, there is the “Quantified Self” movement where
we as individuals are encouraged to measure our sleep, steps and food intake to create statistics on
our own lives. The general mantra of Western society seems to be that everything can be measured,
and everything should be measured. This is especially the case when it comes to any kind of policy,
which should now be “evidence-based”. It makes it difficult to be against evaluation; it is something
that can perhaps be delayed, but ultimately not avoided. In a way, the necessity to do evaluation
has progressively become a “protected discourse”; something that holds a near sacred status and
that society’s dominant forces do not question. (Dahler-Larsen 2012:3, quoting James March)
This thesis is about an on-going trend within the development industry to build national evaluation
capacity in developing countries. Coming up on the International Year of Evaluation in 2015, we’ve
seen a shift in thinking when it comes to aid modalities, with new principles such as ownership,
harmonization, participation, and results-based management. There has also been a shift in the way
aid money flows – from projects to budget and sector support – which has had a huge impact on
the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems of both donors and developing countries. National
M&E systems have been the subject of an ambitious reform agenda, since donors have moved
away from an ex-ante type of aid conditionality, to an ex-post type of conditionality in which further
aid is depending on a proven record of results and progress. Further, the participation of civil
society in national M&E systems has been widely encouraged. (Gildemyn 2013:146) In the world
of policy and international development, the intense focus on M&E and building capacity for this
have been crystalized in the Accra Agenda for Action in 2008, after which the international
coalition known as EvalPartners was formed. The purpose of this self-defined global movement is
to strengthen national evaluation capacities and introduce monitoring and evaluation as a strategy
for producing evidence of the world “we” want and improve peoples’ lives through better policy
making. (My M&E 2013) The growing social accountability agenda in Africa has put substantial
emphasis on the monitoring, evaluation, development, and tracking of public resources (see
McNeil and Malena 2010). Zambian civil society organizations are among the pioneers in engaging
citizens in monitoring and evaluation activities to hold government accountable.
31.1 Research purpose and questions
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the interlocking of evaluation and development in the
Zambian context to see what forces and underlying assumptions are at play in what is now called
“building national evaluation capacity”. I take an anthropological approach to examine actors,
means, and challenges in this evaluation capacity building project, while focusing in particular on
civil society organizations as central actors in the new aid modality. The first question of this thesis
examines this on-going trend by asking the following:
How can we understand the current drive to build national evaluation capacity in a
developing country like Zambia?
I argue that there are two sides to the “evaluation capacity coin” and they are both subject to the
external influence of donors and trends in the current aid architecture. First, the evaluation capacity
building project is about building internal evaluation capacity in institutions and organizations, while
supporting a professionalization through national evaluation associations and other local actors.
Parallels can be drawn from the study of evaluation capacity building from an anthropological
perspective to other “capacity building” efforts or “exports” to developing countries, and more
broadly to how certain phenomena or “assemblages” move from one place to another.
Second, the other side of the evaluation capacity coin is about strengthening civil society
organizations to have the capacity to externally monitor and evaluate pro-poor development policy,
government service delivery and national expenditure. This is where Zambia is a particularly
interesting case, with an organized civil society who carries out an annual community M&E project
that seeks to empower citizens and hold government accountable. Therefore, the second question
of the thesis is:
How is evaluation used as a strategy for social accountability and pro-poor development
by Zambia’s civil society organizations?
The primary interest here is in the means and ways of performing community monitoring and
evaluation, and the surrounding challenges in producing and utilizing this knowledge with the
intention to bring about social accountability and pro-poor development. External influences and
trends in the aid regime play a significant role in these kinds of M&E projects, especially as most
civil society organizations are dependent on external funding.
41.2 Delimitations
Naturally, the M&E capacity building efforts are also directed towards the government sectors, but
an in-depth analysis of these are beyond the limits of this thesis, although some references will be
made to these efforts in brief.
As for my second research question, I focused my Zambian field study on a civil society umbrella
network called Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) which is the one network that together
with member organizations run an externally funded, continuous project called the Budget
Execution and Service Delivery Barometer, which is about civil society-led monitoring and
evaluation of government-implemented development policies (described further in section 4.3).
This is a multi-faceted project and while I attempt to include many of its aspects, a comprehensive
analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis. Methodologically, I rely on interviews with various
informants involved in the project, unfortunately it was poor timing for any field observations or
participation as data collection for the project is only carried out once a year.
1.3 Thesis outline
The following chapter (2) will take its departure in anthropology, and provide background and a
review of previous research in relevant fields, as well as a discussion of theoretical perspectives.
Chapter 3 is dedicated to the methodology surrounding the field study that I undertook in Zambia
as well as a note on how I analyzed my data using ATLAS.ti, a qualitative data analysis software.
Chapter 4 provides background on the Zambian context in terms of political and civil society
climate, relevant development policies, and an introduction to the civil society network CSPR. The
following two chapters are dedicated to the analysis; chapter 5 focus on an indigenization of M&E
in Zambia by examining capacity building actors or mediators and the professional evaluation
association(s), while chapter 6 contains an examination of CSPR’s Budget Execution and Service
Delivery Barometer and analyses different aspects of using evaluation as a strategy for social
accountability and pro-poor development.
52. Background, theoretical foundations and concepts
This chapter will give a broader introduction to the thesis topic by providing some background
and theoretical foundations, as well as defining central concepts used in the thesis.
2.1 An anthropological inquiry into evaluation in development
How can we use an anthropological perspective to understand the mobility of “M&E” across
boundaries, and how it does, or does not, become “indigenized” in developing countries through
capacity building efforts? What is the usefulness of an “evaluation culture” as a concept? The
following sections will discuss these issues while simultaneously providing the foundations for my
analysis of evaluation capacity building efforts and civil society-led evaluation in Zambia.
The academic field of an anthropology of evaluation is still in its cradle, and has been described by
Copeland-Carson (2005:7) as the comparative study of how people evaluate, in terms of “the ways
of knowing, being, and valuing”. The anthropology of evaluation is further depicted as the ultimate
transdiscipline, drawing from a number of other disciplines and subfields. Indeed, this thesis makes
use of both anthropological and sociological subfields on development and knowledge, as well as
the perspectives of evaluators and political scientists. Among the anthropologists studying
development, Mosse (2005:3) has examined “the new architecture of aid”, which refers to the shift
from project aid to policy reform and budget support, the emphasis on poverty reduction and
empowerment, and the new “aid packages” for public sector management and support to civil
society under the “governance” rubric. It is believed by aid practitioners that this new aid
management regime will solve past problems of aid efficiency and to really benefit all stakeholders,
with its policy being embedded in “populist norms of poverty reduction and grassroots
empowerment” (Gould 2005:62). In the new architecture of aid, we have seen a focus on
governance and a reframing of aid relationships in terms of local ownership and partnership
(donors are now referred to as “cooperating partners”). Simultaneously, however, any failings or
corruption scandals in the governments of developing countries are now of central concern to the
donors, as the reorganization of state and society in the name of good governance has become part
of the means of international development. (Mosse 2005:4-5) The ethnographies of aid presented
in Mosse and Lewis book (2005) show the complexity, diversity and the often contradictory set of
policy goals and practices that this new aid regime encompasses. Anthropological inquiries into the
policy rhetoric of ownership has revealed its complexity and multiple meanings in different
situations; in one case a shift to national budgetary support, in another the promotion of civil
society as a countervailing power. (Mosse 2005: 11, 22) Local ownership in this thesis is also about
6the more general trend towards indigenizing the management of development (see Marsden 1994),
which also includes the indigenization of M&E, as will be discussed in section 2.4. In further
understanding the process of “exporting” evaluation across boundaries, we may look to Collier and
Ong who has dubbed certain phenomena (ranging from technoscience and regimes of ethics to
systems of administration or governance) as “global assemblages”. As global forms are
territorialized in assemblages, “they define new material, collective, and discursive relationships”
and constitute sites for the “formation and reformation of anthropological problems”. (2005:4)
The argument I wish to make throughout this thesis is that this evaluation capacity building process
that is underway in a developing country like Zambia (and many others) cannot be separated from
our own “evaluation culture” in Western societies, and must be understood in relation to the new
aid architecture which has its own values, methods, policies, and agendas that all influence CSO-
led evaluation. The concept of an evaluation culture will be examined below, but first it is necessary
to unpack the M&E concept and discuss some appropriate definitions.
2.2 The mysterious acronym that is M&E
Although the title of this thesis leaves out the first part of the acronym that is Monitoring, it remains
in this case inseparable from Evaluation in the realm of capacity building in development countries,
as will be evident in later chapters. M&E is a well-established acronym, especially within
international development, and yet its meaning remains ambiguous and the difference between
monitoring and evaluation is often questioned.
Starting with evaluation, the available literature offers a plethora of definitions. One that is
frequently occurring, with slight modifications, is given by Weiss (1998: 4); “Evaluation is the
systematic assessment of the operation and/or the outcomes of a program or policy, compared to a set of
explicit or implicit standards, as a means of contributing to the improvement of the program or policy.”
This definition is certainly pragmatic and would be very helpful if we were to undertake an actual
evaluation in the next chapters. However, for my research purpose, I am more concerned about
the concept’s relation to ever-present social and political values. A more appropriate definition
would therefore be to say that systematic evaluation “is conceptualized as a social and politicized
practice that nonetheless aspires to some position of impartiality and fairness, so that evaluation
can contribute meaningfully to the well-being of people in that specific context and beyond” (Shaw,
Greene, and Mark 2006: 6, quoted in Dahler-Larsen 2012: 9). The contribution to peoples’ well-
7being is central as proponents of evaluation (very similar to proponents of development), view it
with an inherent optimism that evaluation will lead to betterment, learning, and greater efficiency;
making it a universal good (Dahler-Larsen 2012:4).
With regards to monitoring, it is sometimes subsumed in definitions of evaluation, such as that of
Rossi and Freeman (1985: 19); “evaluation research involves the use of social research
methodologies to judge and to improve the planning, monitoring, effectiveness, and efficiency of
health, education, welfare, and other human service programs”. But the act of monitoring a
program, project, or any other social intervention, and how it differs from an evaluation is perhaps
best shown in a direct comparison between the activities included in both practices. Nolan (2002:
204) has provided us with a clear table over the key differences between monitoring and evaluation:
Table 1.
Monitoring Evaluation
 Tracks daily events  Takes a long-range view
 Accepts policies and rules  Questions policies and rules
 Accepts plans and targets  Asks if plans and targets are
accurate and appropriate
 Checks work against targets  Checks targets against reality
 Stresses input/output relationships  Stresses project purpose and goal
 Looks mainly at how project delivery
occurs
 Looks also at unplanned things,
causes, and assumptions
 Reports in terms of progress  Reports in terms of lessons
learned
Source: Nolan (2002: 204).
We can sum this up by stating that evaluation becomes a much bigger challenge when monitoring
doesn’t take place, which is why capacity building efforts in evaluation often include training in
how to monitor projects as well as evaluating them. Naturally, things can look somewhat different
in the reality of projects and programs, especially concerning what model of evaluation that is being
used in each case. Now that we have our initial definitions and understandings of M&E, it is only
prudent to give a brief history of evaluation and the developments and reasons for speaking about
an “evaluation culture” on export.
2.3 Toward an evaluation culture
People evaluate all the time, they make judgments on movies they have seen, books they have read,
the quality of recently purchased gadgets or perhaps whether everything actually was better in the
8old days. In other words, it is probable that people have always been evaluating in the simplest
sense of the word. But scholars seem to agree that large-scale evaluation in its professional,
scientific, and institutionalized form began in the United States in the 1960’s, during the time when
many social programs were launched, and the cost of social welfare increased exponentially
whereby it was required to systematically evaluate the results (Weiss 1998: 12; Pawson & Tilley
1997: 2; Toulemonde 2000: 351). The use of quantitative methods long dominated evaluation
research, as it did in most other forms of research in the 1950’s and 1960’s (May 2011:222). In what
came to be known as the “paradigm wars”, qualitative methods gained momentum in the late
1970’s and 1980’s and challenged the frequent and exclusive use of quantitative approaches such
as the randomized experimental designs. This was also a time when the utilization of evaluations
gained increased attention. Qualitative techniques became increasingly used in evaluations,
advancing its legitimacy and showing the benefits of relying not just on numbers but also on words
(through informal interviewing and observations). (Weiss 1998: 14) Especially during what has
been referred to as Fourth Generation Evaluation, it became more common to use participation and
dialogue in guiding evaluation methodology. The point was to go beyond “just getting the facts”,
to also take into account the social, political, cultural, and human elements involved (Guba &
Lincoln 1989:8). Evaluation as a field has since the mid-90’s again seen an increased focus on
experimental, quantitative methods along with the attention to “evidence-based” policy, and the
central goal of finding evidence for “what works” (Sandberg & Faugert 2012:14).
As Pawson and Tilley has remarked, we live in the age of the specialist, with an increasing number
of the particular specialists that go by the name of evaluators. The fact that there are now so many
of them is attributed to the society we live in; knowledge-centered, management-fixated,
information-processing, and value-adding (1997: xi-xii). Dahler-Larsen has studied evaluation as a
social phenomenon, and argues that the unprecedented amount of resources, societal influence,
and attention that “our type of society” have allotted to evaluation was – during a reflexive
modernity – produced by a general doubt in progress, which has “run out of steam”. The current
social imaginary celebrates a “neorigorism” built on fear and risk management, while seeing a
revival of the rational, management-oriented and bureaucratic organization that is hoped to secure
order, predictability, and non-subjectivism. (2012: 142, 176).
The concept of an “evaluation culture” has been circulating for some time, mainly among
evaluators and evaluation capacity builders themselves. Toulemonde (2000) has discussed
evaluation culture(s) in Europe and identified both endogenous and exogenous factors for the
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Programming-Budgeting-System (PPBS) in the United States, international professional evaluation
networks, the European Structural Funds, and development aid institutions (such as the OECD
and the World Bank). In the policy sphere, the American Planning-Programming-Budgeting-
System helped export evaluation to Northern Europe, and commissions, units, or agencies were
created to engage in policy analysis. An evaluation culture started to spread further in Europe
through policy networks, in particular those open to international trends, such as research and –
the main focus here – development aid. Thus, one of the more decisive forces for the diffusion of
an evaluation culture in Europe has been the European Union, especially OECD. The mandatory
evaluations of all socioeconomic programs financed via the Structural Funds was instrumental in
getting evaluation off the ground in many European countries. The internal factors for fostering
an evaluation culture included in varying degrees national audit offices, parliaments, and ministries
of finance. Toulemonde further discusses degrees and forms of “maturity” for an evaluation
culture. In his view, most countries in the European Union are in the process of reaching a relatively
mature evaluation culture in the sense of its politico-administrative integration and multiplicity of
evaluators, but not in a way that there is a democratic evaluation culture where citizens participate
in public sector evaluation. (Toulemonde, 2000) Following this line of thought, in a volume to
which Toulemonde also contributed, Furubo and others (2002) have described the different aspects
of a “mature” evaluation culture as involving a degree of evaluative praxis integrated within the
political and administrative system, and a plurality and openness towards new perspectives in
evaluation. Furubo and his group has set up nine criteria upon which the existence of such a
“mature” evaluation culture can be judged on a score from 0 to  2, and I will do my best in trying
to briefly summarize them here;
(1) Evaluation is practiced in several policy domains and is not an isolated activity.
(2) There is a plurality of evaluators specialized in different methods and disciplines.
(3) A national discourse exists on evaluation that is resulting from the particular national
environment and not on “imported goods”.
(4) Evaluation exists as a profession with its own national association, or there’s frequent
attendance at international associations’ meetings, and a discussion on professional ethics.
(5) The government has institutional measures to conduct evaluation and disseminate the results
to decision makers; i.e. utilization of evaluation results is not neglected.
(6) The parliament, much like the government, also has institutional measures for carrying out
evaluations and disseminating the results.
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(7) Pluralism with regards to different policy domains; different people or agencies perform
evaluations and there is no single organizational body dominating a policy domain.
(8) There are evaluation activities in the Supreme Audit Institution1, and finally;
(9) The evaluations performed shouldn’t focus solely on input/output relationships or technical
production, some should instead measure the impact of public interventions and focus on public
sector program/project outcomes. (Furubo et al. 2002:7-9)
Although practically no attention has been focused on explaining why the “culture” concept is used
in this case, I would interpret it as an aspiration to try and capture the widespread existence of a
systematic practice, that encompasses a set of knowledges, values, methods, and also attitudes
pertaining to the usefulness and value (one might even say sacredness) of the practice that is
evaluation itself. Beyond this, it is something that is not bounded or isolated, but travels across
boundaries, and is at the same time influencing and open to other influences. This definition goes
beyond other descriptions such as that of Dahler-Larsen (2012:164) who states that evaluation
culture is “the norms, values, and habits related to evaluation”. The working definition of an
evaluation culture in this thesis is reminiscent of Collier and Ong’s (2005: 4) concept of global
assemblages; that are “abstractable, mobile, and dynamic, moving across and reconstituting
‘society’, ‘culture’, and ‘economy’”, making an evaluation culture comparable to other assemblages
or phenomena with a “global” quality.
While I could not subscribe to a linear way of thinking about a “maturing” evaluation culture, there
are some aspects of the framework described above that is of particular interest for my own topic.
It is not my intention here to assess the evaluation culture in Zambia on some scale of “maturity”.
Rather, I am interested in certain aspects of Furubo and others reasoning that can aid the
understanding of the current drive to build evaluation capacity in developing countries, such as the
differentiating between internal and external factors. It is obvious that an evaluation culture is rarely
something that arises solely from within a society; external influences play a pivotal role. This has
been, and continues to be the case, not just for various Western countries, but also for developing
countries. Evaluation in new democracies was imported by international donor agencies and
foundations who commissioned evaluations of their own programs as well as the projects by their
grantees that were often civil society organizations (Kosheleva & Segone 2013:569). This trend has
now developed further, and in the next section we will take a closer look at the interlinking of
international development and an evaluation culture.
1 A Supreme Audit Institution is an independent, national body at highest level that provides external audits of
government bodies.
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2.4 The relationship between evaluation and development
As soon as an academic field blossoms into being, it won’t take long before subfields begin to
mushroom. “Development evaluation” surfaced as what I would characterize as a subfield within
evaluation research and practice, but in the particular setting of international aid and development
interventions. Its existence has been subject to critique, recently by Carden (2013:577), who has
argued that development evaluation is not a permanent field, it emerged in the context of
international development aid and will become increasingly marginalized as development evolves
and is less driven by donor agencies and more by national governments, civil society, and other
actors. Therefore, it doesn’t represent a long-term approach to evaluation, and according to
Carden, it does not serve the donor agencies very well either, as development evaluation has
focused on single projects and not taking the whole system into account. On the other side of the
spectrum, Ofir (2013) has contended that the distinction still matters as long as we still live in a
world where some countries have greater vulnerabilities and larger power asymmetries. This poses
a bigger challenge for evaluators, as the evaluation of development initiatives becomes a “high
stakes” endeavor, due to the potential serious consequences of ill-performed evaluations on local
communities.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, “M&E” is now a well-entrenched concept in development
discourse and practice, in the sense that it represents an activity that should be carried out whenever
a project, program, or policy has been implemented. It has joined other buzzwords such as capacity
building, participation, ownership, accountability, and governance, to name a few. These concepts
are often closely linked, and “M&E” has fit in nicely; capacity building now also comprises “ECB” -
Evaluation Capacity Building, so that governments and civil society organizations can learn how
to do monitoring and evaluation, ideally improving governance and leading to greater accountability,
while encouraging participation through civil society-led evaluations that support local ownership of
the development process. Pro-poor development is another concept that is frequently mentioned
in the new aid regime, and in the following chapters its meaning is quite simply defined as the
intention to “put the last first” (to borrow a line from Chambers) in development policy
formulation and implementation.
In this thesis, I make use of Olivier de Sardan’s concept of “the developmentalist configuration”,
which defines development in terms of being “a complex set of institutions, flows and actors, for
whom development constitutes a resource, a profession, a market, a stake, or a strategy” (Olivier
de Sardan, 2005:2). Evaluation has been given a prominent role in the developmentalist
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configuration. As Zenda Ofir (2013:584) has stated; “Development and evaluation are, or should
be, in a tango with each other – the one sometimes leading, and sometimes the other, learning from
each other and working together synergistically to create something meaningful.” The Independent
Evaluation Group (IEG) at the World Bank has linked together evaluation and development by
simply arguing that “evaluation is essential to progress” (IEG World Bank/Heider 2013:7).
Whereas others, like Menon at International Development Evaluation Association (IDEAS) have
posited a link between development and evaluation by defining the ultimate goal of evaluation as
to “improve public action to contribute to people’s well-being”, in which public action represents
people’s agency along with the actions of the state and its partners (2013:26). M&E is now part of
virtually every development strategy, program, and project, and is also considered a resource for
determining the value, effectiveness, and efficiency of development aid. Naturally, actors in the
development configuration have not wasted time in coming up with even more fashionable
acronyms, like “PM&E” – Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation; “PMER” – Planning,
Monitoring, Evaluation, Reporting; or “MELC” – Monitoring, Evaluation, Learning, and
Communications, and the list goes on.
When it comes to evaluation capacity building, there is a slight overlap with the concept of
evaluation culture, as Dahler-Larsen (2012:164-165) has observed. We can understand evaluation
capacity building as the infusion of a set of knowledges, methods, and resources pertaining to
evaluation. In his ethnographic examination of capacity building, Gould (2005: 78) interprets
capacity as a will to modernize and argues that while capacity building might be undertaken with
the purpose of empowering, the most tangible result is often regulation and control through self-
discipline. There are many forms of capacity building, and the justification for many “assemblages
of practices” is through the need to improve the performance of “local” actors. Capacity building
doesn’t just give expression to the will to civilize, but the way it is done “reaffirms sacred values of
the aid domain: modernity, rationality, and political neutrality” (ibid.:69-70). However, this does
not mean that we should succumb to the popular moralism of the subaltern which suggests that
the powerful aid agencies are inherently evil and constantly “mistaken in their policy prescriptions
simply by virtue of their commanding position in the hegemonic regime of partnership”. What
needs to be remembered is what Foucault has called the productive side of power, the sites where
“capacities” in terms of means of mobilization and organization, and modes of awareness that are
generated from mechanisms of “partnership”, which actually do serve the purpose of
empowerment. (Gould 2005.: 81)
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Within the developmentalist configuration, the trend for the past decades has gone towards
increasing the indigenous management of the development process, generally by building
institutional capacity and transferring ownership from external actors to the country in question.
General and sector budget support to national governments have replaced much of the former aid
structure that focused on specific projects and programs. This indigenization trend is also evident
in the case of performing monitoring and evaluation of government-implemented development
policies. Marsden (1994) has discussed this indigenization process in international development,
and provides a critical lens through which to view actors involved in this process, and what lies
behind the idea of “indigenous management”. Questioning the concept of “indigenous” becomes
key in the reality of Western knowledge systems and management tools in the development regime
that travels as “assemblages”, which also includes evaluation.
As we shall see below, CSO-led evaluation means that civil society actors, often on community-
level, work together to produce knowledge on government-implemented development policies and
budget spending. Depending on the political climate, this knowledge can either supplement or
compete with other knowledge such as that produced by government agencies themselves. When
this takes place in a so-called developing country like Zambia, there are often international donor
agencies involved in the mix, supporting both government sectors and civil society organizations.
In understanding knowledge and power relations in this complex setting, we are aided by Long
(1992) who has described development as “battlefields of knowledge”. Seeing as evaluation is
always about producing knowledge, we can consider CSO-led evaluation as both a resource and a
strategy, or “weapon”, on the battlefield that is development. On another level, it is possible to
view different sets of knowledge as competing discourses.
2.5 Civil society organizations leading evaluation
The role of civil society organizations (CSOs) in the monitoring and evaluation of national
development policies has received more attention in the past few years as is evident from (for
example) the global development policies signed in Accra and Busan (section 4.2). The primary
interest here is not in the internal M&E that civil society organizations conduct on their own
projects, but rather what Gildemyn (2013) has termed “CSO-led evaluation” of public service
delivery and national expenditure. CSOs are seen as a driving force for pro-poor development, and
a crucial part of, and resource in tackling a myriad of development and policy challenges. (Segone
et al. 2013: 55). I use the term “civil society organizations” as encompassing not just NGOs, but
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other local affiliations and groups such as religious organizations and community-based
organizations, in short what Copeland-Carson (2005:13) calls “the social loci falling between the
state and the private sphere while overlapping with both”. Nevertheless, parts of the large body of
literature on NGOs and development do apply in this case even if the chosen term here is CSOs.
Lewis (2001:71) has examined the different roles that development NGOs may take on, and the
role of ‘catalyst’ is particularly relevant when discussing CSO-led evaluation. What Lewis has
referred to as the development catalyst role of NGOs is centered on the idea of empowerment, as
many organizations view it as their mission to empower their beneficiaries.
Civil society is also regarded as a form of social capital, defined as “the procedures, practices and
connections that help a society or an organization to work effectively and fairly”, and evaluation is
thought to contribute to this form of social capital (Segone et al. 2013: 53). Whereas evaluation
capacity building during its inception might have been solely for the purpose of ensuring
sustainability of development interventions in local communities (Dahler-Larsen 2012: 163), this
no longer suffices as an explanation for the current evaluation capacity building trend. A lot of
attention is focused on building capacity within civil society, which according to Catsambas and
others (2013: 44), is intended to influence public policy by giving a voice to marginalized people in
society and promote equity-focused and gender-responsive action and policy. Gildemyn (2013:
146) has listed three assumptions for the participation of CSOs in national M&E systems: (1) that
the involvement of civil society would mean greater accountability between government and its
citizens, (2) in comparison with external evaluators, CSOs would have an advantage due to the fact
that they are closer to the local community and have the ability to do continuous monitoring over
a longer time period, and (3) that CSOs would be more experienced in participatory and other
qualitative M&E methods, and employ these to complement the often quantitative approach of
official M&E systems. These assumptions help explain the differences, or at least intended
differences, between CSO-led evaluation and any private evaluation usually done by foreign M&E
specialists. As opposed to government-executed evaluations, CSO-led evaluation of public policy
is carried out independently with the help of local communities.
Gildemyn (2013) has argued that CSO-led evaluation primarily has two functions – social
accountability and/or feedback and learning. In cases of CSO-led evaluations of public policy or
service delivery, increased accountability between governments and citizens is often the goal, but
there is little research on whether or not it’s effective. What this type of evaluation always does,
however, is to produce knowledge – and how this knowledge is used (assuming that it actually is),
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becomes a different challenge and “project” in and of itself. It is this knowledge production,
coupled with external influence on how it should be produced and how it is intended to lead to
greater accountability that is of interest in my analysis. Previous research on the involvement of
civil society in policy have mostly revolved around the PRSPs and civil society participation in the
monitoring and evaluation of these initiatives (see for example Lucas et al. 2004, Eberlei & Siebold
2006, Eberlei 2007). In a broader and more general sense, McGee and Gaventa has discussed what
they call transparency and accountability initiatives, led by civil society actors as a way of
empowering people and bring about a more effective response to the needs of the people that is
represented by the CSOs. The authors further dissect the development logic behind the recent
attention paid to accountability, noting that: “the argument is that through accountability, the leaky
pipes of corruption and inefficiency will be repaired, aid and public spending will be channeled
more effectively, and development initiatives will produce greater and more visible results.”
(McGee and Gaventa 2011:6-7) Holding those elected into power accountable is inherent in the
idea of democracy, and from this follows the idea of accountability – but just as there are efforts
to reshape democracy, there are efforts to reinvent accountability. According to Goetz and Jenkins
(2005: 1-2), we are witnessing a global upsurge of such efforts – a new accountability agenda
especially in the developing world where democracy is still young and fragile and where people will
turn away from it swiftly when accountable governance is constantly out of reach. Social
accountability refers to the myriad of ways that civil society actors can hold the state accountable,
as well as the actions of media, government, and other actors that facilitate or promote these
efforts. As observed by McNeil and Malena (2010: 1-2), social accountability efforts like
participatory monitoring of public expenditure and citizen evaluation of service delivery have been
developed over the past decade in countries like India, Brazil, and the Philippines, whereas similar
efforts in less-developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have received less attention. This thesis
will contribute to this under-studied area by focusing on Zambia and civil society’s M&E project,
while drawing parallels where possible to the other African cases presented in McNeil and Malena.
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3. Methodology
This thesis is the result of a minor field study that was carried out in Zambia for ten weeks in 2014.
In this chapter I will discuss methodological choices, mainly semi-structured interviews and the
case study approach, and other reflections on my field study in Zambia, starting with the creation
of the “field” itself. I will conclude this chapter with comments on how I analyzed my data using
qualitative data analysis software.
3.1 The field study taking shape
The conventional methodological assumption within anthropology of the field as a well-defined
physical site has been challenged by rapid globalization (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). A researcher
never enters a field; the field is always created to some extent by the researcher on the one hand,
and the research subjects on the other, and this will determine what and whom will be included in
that particular field (see Sjöberg 2011, Long 1992). When I finally got through Zambian customs
three hours after landing, I knew I had to start creating my own “field”, and this was not going to
be without its challenges.
I took an actor-oriented approach to creating my field, and a lot of time went into the actor analysis;
i.e. trying to figure out who the actors are, who does what, the power relations between the different
actors, and, not least, how to gain access to them. The actor analysis can easily become a research
project all on its own, which I was doing my best in trying to avoid. I started out with a list of
organizations, many of which I had emailed well before I arrived in Zambia, but hadn’t yet heard
from. The list was the result partly of my own internet research on local civil society organizations,
and partly of suggestions from my Zambian contact with a promising name; Wisdom. At times I
found myself a tad envious of the earlier anthropologists, the ones who would travel to a remote
island to do research while having had minimal previous contact with its inhabitants, and this wasn’t
expected of them, because there wasn’t really any reliable way of initiating such contact, except face
to face. Today, however, in our globalized world with the long arms of modern technology reaching
as far as into the deepest jungles or the most remote mud house villages, I sensed the expectations
had changed. Wasn’t I supposed to have set up contact with an array of potential informants, and
have at least a hand-full of interviews already scheduled, before I even sat foot outside Lusaka
airport? In truth, I wasn’t even able to pre-arrange a meeting with my local supervisor at University
of Zambia, who kept telling me – perhaps skeptical of modern technology – that first I should
arrive in Lusaka, and then we’ll make an appointment!
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There was also the fact that I ended up spending a lot of my time in Lusaka, the capital city in
which my initial activities did not really feel like fieldwork. This made the process of shaping my
field a bit more anxious. As remarked by anthropologist Kurotani who doubted the
“appropriateness” of her doing fieldwork in middle-class American suburbs; “In a distant, exotic
place, though, we have the assurance that everything we do – from asking for a direction to the
village chief’s house, to negotiating prices at a local market – is a legitimate part of fieldwork.”
(Kurotani 2004: 204) In this case, my first few weeks in Lusaka largely consisted of what Kurotani
calls the “telephone and shop” phase; trying to get situated and making calls to all the people who
had not responded to my emails. Most of it did not exactly feel like proper fieldwork activities,
even if I did make an effort to learn some polite phrases in “Town Nyanja” – the most commonly
spoken local language in Lusaka. Fortunately, my supervisor at University of Zambia stuck to his
words and I was able to get a meeting with him in my first week. The rest of my field study,
however, turned out to be an exercise in patience, perseverance, and flexibility on almost all matters.
3.2 Finding a case to study
Although I had sought to avoid the “urban bias” that is often present in research in “developing”
countries, I soon realized that in Zambia, this bias extended to the civil society organizations who
were all clustered in the capital city, Lusaka. The reasons for this are first and foremost that the
donor agencies are also clustered in Lusaka, and so are the decision making bodies of the
government which is still highly centralized in Zambia (Elemu 2010: 25). My initial approach was
to try and gain access to a couple of organizations to find out more about the integration of
evaluation and the M&E capacity from a local perspective. However, I found it difficult to get a
response when emailing to an organization’s official email address found at their website. It proved
to be much more successful, albeit more complicated, to track down an individual within the
organization and contact him/her directly. This was also the slightly more risky approach, in terms
of potentially by-passing hierarchies that could make it difficult for me to find more informants
higher up in the organization later on. Luckily in my case, my Zambian friend Wisdom gave me
the contacts of a friend of his, the head of Research and Policy Analysis at Civil Society for Poverty
Reduction (CSPR). This is when I learned about the Budget Expenditure and Service Delivery
monitoring that this civil society network was leading, and that I found particularly interesting in
all its complexity. This continuous project will be discussed in detail in chapter six, but in brief, it
concerns community monitoring and evaluation of government service delivery and budget
expenditure through participatory methods across the country, carried out once or twice a year
depending on available funds. CSPR and their aforementioned project became my main case study
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for this thesis. After gaining access through my contact, I interviewed three of their employees;
two at the headquarters in Lusaka, and their Provincial Coordinator in Choma, Southern Province.
I was happy to get out of the capital for a few days, and I got to learn more about the actual work
and field methodology. Unfortunately, I couldn’t have timed my field study to actually observe the
data collections in the communities (which had already been done in January for the 2013 report),
but I did get detailed information through my interview on the methodology, for which I also
received a lot of documents such as score cards and questionnaires. The case study is approached
from an interpretivist perspective where the purpose is to understand the complexity of a particular
case and its activity within a specific setting, not ruling out the possibility for generalization, but
this is not the main goal of the research. It requires the researcher to be “ever-reflective in their
search for the sequence and course of events which are interrelated and contextually bound”. (May
2011: 224-225)
As I was also interested in the process that I interpreted as “indigenizing” M&E and building local
evaluation capacity, and while trying to be holistic about my case study, I continued to search for
other informants who could give me more insight into M&E in Zambia. An unexpectedly good
tool in this process turned out to be the online professional network, LinkedIn, where I would
connect with one informant, and then have his/her professional network open up to me – which
made it a lot easier to find more informants in the same field (M&E). Modern technology does
have its benefits. It also had the added advantage that, as I reached out to a new potential informant,
I could refer to someone we had in common; we were already interconnected in that online,
pseudo-real but comforting way; I was not a complete stranger. In the end, aside from informants
at CSPR and my local supervisor at University of Zambia, I managed to find informants from the
two national evaluation associations (that have now merged into one), the Zambia Governance
Foundation (grant givers that focus a lot on evaluation capacity building), and an NGO called
Society for Women Against AIDS in Zambia, that recently carried out a similar service delivery
and budget tracking project as CSPR, albeit in much smaller scale.
In the words of Norman Long, it’s important to treat the researcher (i.e. the author) as: “an active
social agent who struggles to understand social processes through entering the life-worlds of local
actors who, in turn, actively shape the researcher’s own fieldwork strategies, thus moulding the
contours and outcomes of the research process itself.” (1992: ix) I had been warned that I might
encounter some “research fatigue” among civil society; that is, many organizations are tired of
being approached by researchers unless they see any potential gain for the organization. There can
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also be some suspicion when it comes to outsiders, especially when the subjects touch on anything
donor-related, or other sensitive information that organizations fear could lead to negative
implications for their future financial survival. This is why it was important to try and have someone
“introduce” me to the next informant. I always introduced myself as a Swedish graduate student
working on my master’s thesis (thus not something that was going to be published), and that I was
in Zambia thanks to a minor field study grant from the Swedish International Development
cooperation Agency (SIDA), but that they had not commissioned my research. I didn’t encounter
much research fatigue, nor suspicion, but I became very aware of my informants’ often crowded
schedules and tight deadlines, and was humbled that they nevertheless gave me their time and
offered elaborate answers to my interview questions.
3.3 On using semi-structured interviews
During my field study in Zambia, I conducted a total of nine interviews with eight informants. The
decision to use semi-structured interviews was not a difficult one as I wanted my informants to be
able to elaborate freely and give detailed and in-depth answers. I also wanted to elicit their views
on current events and their experiences. Taking a cue from Rubin (2005), I regarded the people I
interviewed more as conversational partners, trying to balance my probes, checks, and prompts.
The topics or questions that I used during my interviews depended on who I was interviewing at
the time and what organization they were involved in. Some recurring themes, however, were the
political and economic climate for civil society in Zambia, and also the informants’ perceptions and
interpretations of the local capacity to conduct M&E and engage with government on M&E and
policy matters.
I recorded some of my interviews, from which I am able to give exact quotes, while for some of
them I decided to take notes by hand. My decision to either record or take notes during an interview
was often not made until I had met the informant face to face and introduced myself. This was to
let my instincts and previous experience in interviewing interpret the appropriateness of using a
recording device, as some informants can find this intimidating and it might affect what sort of,
and the amount of data that the researcher may get. For my research interest, which to some degree
included asking questions about donor relations and CSO funding and capacities, it was pivotal to
establish a certain comfort level and trust whereby the interviewee could speak freely without being
overly concerned about potential consequences. From an ethical perspective, they were all given
the opportunity to be anonymous before answering any questions. As English is the official
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language in Zambia, all of my informants spoke it fluently which meant that there was no need for
a translator, thus contributing to making the interviews more of a conversation.
3.4 A note on qualitative data analysis using software technology
Picking up from the discussion on far reaching modern technology above; have the expectations
on data analysis also changed with the advent of new technology? My answer would be yes.
Quantitative researchers have been using software technology for some time now, coding and
analyzing their data, producing neat graphics and tables. Now there are a limited number of
programs out there that can be used by qualitative researchers who may also code their data in
order to facilitate the analysis. I would argue that whether you’re dealing with a set of case studies,
a larger body of articles for discourse analysis, or as in my case, around 30 000 words worth of
semi-structured interviews, not counting the reports and other documents I received from my
informants, it helps to make use of 21st century technology when sorting through and trying to
analyze all this information. I made use of what is probably one of, if not the most common
“QDA” software, ATLAS.ti, and the only book I managed to find about the program, written by
Friese (2012). Instead of immediately making use of the program’s every bell and whistle, I focused
on “coding” – essentially categorizing – my material, using the “comment field” to write down
interesting things I noticed while coding. As Friese puts it, the coding function corresponds to “the
time-honored manual practice of marking (underlining or highlighting) and annotating text
passages in a book or other documents” (ibid: 10).
The analytic framework presented in Friese’s book is called NCT – noticing, collecting, and
thinking, and is not intended to follow in a direct sequential process but rather suggests a recursive
process of moving back and forth between the three. Rather self-explanatory, it involves noticing
interesting things in the data, collecting these by coding them, and thinking about them – as the
researcher still has to be the brain in qualitative data analysis. (ibid.: 92, 101-102)
With regards to my case study on CSO-led evaluation, I found the RAPID framework (Research
and Policy in Development group at the Overseas Development Institute, presented in Court &
Young 2004: 2), helpful in thinking about ways of coding and organizing my data with the following
four elements: External influence, political context, evidence, links. The interrelatedness of these
areas in understanding the link between research and policy, and where M&E is situated in this is
demonstrated by the figure below.
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Figure 1.
Some of the codes that I used in analyzing my data were directly drawn from the figure above while
others emerged from the data, such as “M&E perception” which referred to quotes from
informants on the local perceptions of what “M&E” is about. There was a certain overlap and
linkages between codes named “rights-based approach”, “empowerment”, and “knowledge”, but
instead of merging the codes into a singular one, I formed a “network” (another neat function) of
the three codes that I simply named “REK”, while another network, “Links” included codes such
as “CSPR media relations”, “information dissemination”, and “policy advocacy”. These are merely
some examples to illustrate the ways in which QDA software aids the process of thinking about
and analyzing qualitative data.
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4. The Zambian setting: Politics, development, and civil society
In this chapter, the purpose of the first section is to acquaint the reader with the political and
economic context in Zambia, and the role of civil society in a brief historical perspective. Next, the
impact of international development policies and aid modalities on Zambian civil society will be
discussed, before introducing the Zambian civil society network, Civil Society for Poverty
Reduction, whose community M&E project was the subject of my case study.
4.1 Political economy and CSO climate
Zambia has seen a recent economic growth following a rise in global copper prices, and in 2011 it
“graduated” from a position as a low income country to a lower middle-income country. However,
the country has not been able to decrease the percentage of the population that are living in poverty,
which is at 42 % and has slowed down in its declining pace. The proportion of Zambians living in
extreme poverty has decreased in the past decade, but the number of Zambians in rural areas living
in extreme poverty has, paradoxically, increased. The development has been concentrated in urban
areas such as Lusaka and the Copperbelt, where most of the foreign direct investment is being
made. (UNDP 2013: 16-17)
Zambian civil society, understood in its broadest sense as the social loci between the state and the
private sphere, began emerging just before independence, but was mostly based on regional politics
that created platforms for citizens to engage in national affairs. In the Second Republic (1973-
1991), during the Kaunda regime with the slogan “kumulu Lesa, panshi Kaunda” – meaning “in
the heavens, God, down here, Kaunda” – (cited in Elemu 2010: 21), all civil society organizations
were outlawed. During this time, Zambia was a one-party state under Kaunda, who promoted an
ideology of state control over all spheres of society. Under his regime, civil society organizations
were created in different sectors, usually in the form of cooperatives and unions, to make sure that
the Party state controlled all social forces. This resulted in what has been termed “state-led civil
society”. Kaunda’s regime was finally challenged in 1990 by the church and trade unions, among
other dissenting voices who transformed themselves into the political party of Movement for
Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) which ultimately ended the one-party Kaunda rule. From that
point, there was an explosion of civil society actors in areas such as governance and human rights.
(ibid.: 21-22) A typology over different civil society organizations have been provided by Elemu
(2010:25), who distinguishes between small CSOs revolving around a charismatic leader and larger
CSOs with formalized structures; membership-based and non-membership based CSOs; other civil
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society components such as trade unions, professional associations; and finally “national” CSOs
with regards to geographical coverage. The common feature of these different CSOs, however, is
that they are highly dependent on external donor support, and it follows that CSOs tend to
mushroom in areas that correspond to donor interests. (ibid.: 26)
Civil society and the current government
The current government of the Patriotic Front, led by Michael Sata who was elected in 2011, is in
the process of enforcing a new constitution. This is referred to as the “people-driven” constitution
that is supposed to reflect broad collective interests. During the time of my field study in Zambia,
the government had produced a draft of the new, “people-driven” constitution, but ironically
enough they refused to release the draft to the people, causing much stir and media attention. Civil
society organizations had a prominent role in the public urgings to the government about informing
the people of the contents of the draft, as well as a time frame for the adoption of the new
constitution. As one of my CSPR informants commented; “This type of government that is in now,
when in opposition they would even support us, and all our messages for tax justice, for pro-poor
allocation of resources to all those sectors we talked about. Today, they are turning back on the
promises that they made”.
Another debate raging in the media (although at the time of research rather overshadowed by the
relentless constitution debate) regarded the so-called NGO Act. This act was launched in 2009 and
required NGOs to register their organization with the government as well as start paying taxes. It
also required all civil society organizations to declare assets and reveal their sources of funding
(Mumba 2014: 4). The Sata government established the Non-Governmental Organization
Registration Board with the task of monitoring the operations of the NGOs. This regulatory body
is also supposed to register and approve the area of work for those NGOs operating in Zambia, as
well as make recommendations of audit rules and procedures for NGO accounts.2 Opposition to
the Act was led by a coalition of civil society actors; NGOCC, CSPR, WFC, among others. They
were arguing that the NGO Act and its implication of obligatory registration was undercutting the
country’s democracy and was simply a government tool to impose their control over civil society
(Mumba 2014). The debate had dragged on into 2014, and the government only recently announced
that they would go back to the drawing board, invite some representatives from various
organizations, and revisit the contents of the Act. It thus seemed like the pressure from civil society
2 Lusaka Times, 2013-03-01, <http://www.lusakatimes.com/2013/03/01/government-launches-registration-board-
to-monitor-operations-of-ngos/>
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had had some effect. However, the government was urging NGOs to register their organizations
first, in compliance with the current NGO Act, and then later on the discussions and steps back
to the drawing board would be taken. The relatively recent trend of introducing various legal means
of registering NGOs has also been observed in other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (such as
Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia). This might suggest that government openness to civil
society participation in the policy arena has not yet been fully institutionalized. (Jones & Tembo
2008: 7) As remarked by Habasonda (2010: 51); “Mistrust and lack of confidence has been the
hallmark of the government-CSO relationship”, a subject that will be explored further in section
6.3.
Zambia is now into its Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP), but since the current
government took office in 2011, a lot of insecurity has surrounded the implementation of this plan.
The government has stated that because the SNDP was developed under the former government
when the opposition party was in power, it represents their political agenda. Therefore, the
government first needs to “marry their manifesto with the SNDP”, as an informant at a CSO put
it, before arguing that the SNDP should be a national document, and not an object for party politics
which only serves to prolong the plan’s implementation. Now that the political context has been
introduced, we can move on to exploring the impact of some of the more recent international
development policies on Zambia.
4.2 The influence of global development policies
The challenges in coordinating and managing development aid have been well-documented, and
international policies in the last decade have endeavored to improve aid effectiveness and refocus
the efforts. An important step in this was the Paris Declaration that was adopted in 2005. It is
centered on reforming the delivery and management of aid, based on the five principles of
ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability (OECD
2005). While this declaration formalized a new framework for the relationship between cooperating
partners (donors) and partner (recipient) countries, it was surprisingly mute on the role of civil
society. Not including civil society in the Paris Declaration meant that CSOs in Zambia had little
leverage in trying to promote their priorities in relation to the declaration. One critical voice went
as far as to argue that the implementation of the Paris Declaration in Zambia officially “legalized
the displacement of civil society by CPs [Cooperating Partners] from the dialogue table”, and made
the Zambian government more accountable to the donors than to its own citizenry. Ultimately, the
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Paris Declaration failed to recognize the resources of civil society organizations to strengthen good
governance and contribute to economic, social, and political development. (Mali 2010: 124-127)
Since then, the tide has turned and civil society seems to now have an indisputable role for actors
in the developmentalist configuration. The policy that followed the Paris Declaration was the Accra
Agenda for Action (AAA) in 2008, which not only reaffirmed the overall message on aid
effectiveness and coordination in the Paris Declaration, but also identified ownership, inclusive
partnerships, delivering results, and capacity development as areas for improvement. At the Accra
meeting, it was recognized that civil society also need to participate along with the national
government and donor agencies. (OECD 2008) An important consequence of the meeting was
also the formation of the EvalPartners Initiative as mentioned in the introduction; a joint initiative
launched by Unicef and IOCE with support from international donors to promote national
evaluation capacity building in the following ways; facilitation of peer-to-peer cooperation among
VOPEs (Voluntary Organizations for Professional Evaluation), developing a toolkit for
institutional capacity within VOPEs, generate new knowledge on VOPE operation, promoting an
“enabling environment” for evaluation, and supporting equity-focused and gender-responsive
evaluation. (Kosheleva and Segone 2013: 569) The Busan Partnership for Effective Development
Co-operation in 2011 placed further emphasis on the role of CSOs in ensuring accountability for
public policy implementation and advocating for transparency in budget expenditure while
increasing demand for evaluation to inform evidence-based policy making. (Catsambas et al. 2013:
46)
Aside from the international development policies discussed above, another one of the building
blocks that signified a change in the approach to development by actors in the developmentalist
configuration, and which had significant impact on the growth and organization of civil society in
Zambia, was the IMF Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). Civil society involvement in the
formulation, monitoring, and evaluation of the PRSPs in Zambia is largely concentrated to the
subject of my case study; the civil society network called Civil Society for Poverty Reduction, which
will be explored in the following section.
4.3 Civil Society for Poverty Reduction
This section will describe the Zambian civil society network called Civil Society for Poverty
Reduction (CSPR), and situate the network’s creation in the context of the new architecture of aid,
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starting with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper process and civil society’s role in this. The
purpose is to provide the context for the case study of the CSPR “Budget Execution and Service
Delivery Monitoring Project” that will be analyzed in chapter 6.
The Civil Society for Poverty Reduction is a membership-based, umbrella network for civil society
organizations in Zambia founded in 2000. The initial purpose was to ensure the meaningful
participation of civil society in the formulation, implementation and monitoring of the national
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The head office is a labyrinthine, single-storey house
neatly tucked away behind gates in Lusaka’s North-East outskirts, a place where more and more
organizations and businesses are relocating from the chaotic downtown center. CSPR’s mission is
articulated as to “actively and effectively contribute to poverty reduction and pro-poor
development in Zambia through generating and sourcing evidence based data, advocacy for
responsive policy formulation and implementation; promotion of community participation and
civic engagement in development processes, mobilization and coordination of CSOs for the
provision of a platform and knowledge sharing at all levels.” The work is organized into five
different programmatic areas: Advocacy and Policy Dialogue (APD), Civic Participation and
Engagement (CPE), Institutional Governance and Development (IGD), Information Management
and Communication (IMC), and finally Research and Policy Advocacy (RPA) under which the
Budget Tracking and Service Delivery Monitoring project takes place (also known as the Barometer
project hereinafter).
The organization has field offices in five provinces (Eastern, Western, Southern, North Western,
and Luapula) out of Zambia’s total ten provinces, and its headquarters in Lusaka in the Central
Province. In each of the five provinces, CSPR works in two districts, with a provincial coordinator
that organizes the activities along with member organizations in that particular area. The overall
concern is pro-poor development, and CSPR has given themselves six sectors to focus on, which
are all related to development and poverty reduction; Health, education, agriculture, social
protection, water and sanitation, and infrastructure development.
CSPR’s activities also include simplifying important national documents, such as the national
budget (here I was let in on a private joke about the 5000 page budget being like a woman; very
complicated and impossible to understand fully). This kind of activity has been referred to as
“budget literacy” by some authors (See Gildemyn 2013; McNeil and Malena 2010). Depending on
how much funding is available, the simplifications of the documents will then be translated into
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local languages. CSPR is also involved in disseminating and exchanging information with both local
and international partners on issues of poverty reduction and national development plans. External
donors fund various activities and parts of the organizations work, among the donors are the
Zambian Governance Foundation (ZGF) – a Zambian grant-making organization who in turn
receives funding from a number of European countries, with Sweden (Sida) being the largest
donor. Support for various CSPR activities has also been received from UNICEF and the Embassy
of Finland, while ActionAid Zambia has been funding the setting up of an internal monitoring and
evaluation system.
The network has experienced a member drop from 140 member organizations in 2009 to
somewhere around 70 at this time (2014), my source speculated that this might have something to
do with the five-time increase of the yearly membership fee from a modest 100 kwacha in the early
years to 500 kwacha in 2011. Another possible reason for the decrease is the general economic
climate for CSOs in Zambia, where many struggle to obtain funding and work under financially
insecure conditions. However, some of the influential members that are still part of the network
are the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR), Caritas Zambia, and SACCORD.
Participation in the formulation and M&E of development policies
It has been argued that the founding of CSPR represented a crystallization of doubts from civil
society organizations about the PRSP process launched in 2002 and completed in 2005, and civil
society participation and inclusion in its formulation and monitoring. (Matenga 2010: 67-68)
Whether or not the creation of CSPR was an entirely “indigenous” effort, without any “facilitating”
by external donors, remains unclear, but safe to say that the network has gained a prominent – and
in some ways privileged – position in relation to government, and sometimes the donor
community.
The idea of CSPR was nevertheless that there would be an organizational body that would represent
the voice of civil society in lobbying government, but also to strengthen learning and build financial
and technical capacity among civil society organizations. CSPR spearheaded civil society policy
input into the PRSP, the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP), and participated in the
formulation of the long-term Vision 2030. In both the PRSP and FNDP processes of formulation,
CSPR carried out an independent, parallel process in addition to participating in the official
government consultative processes. CSPR formed working groups on different development areas,
such as food security, HIV/AIDS, governance, and gender. Provincial consultations were carried
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out in four of Zambia’s poorest provinces; Eastern, Luapula, Western, and North-Western, and
data from these consultations along with the working groups culminated in a report entitled “A
PRSP for Zambia – A Civil Society Perspective” that was delivered to the government. A similar
procedure was conducted for the FNDP, parallel to the official consultation process. CSPR also
conducted its own evaluation of the PRSP and introduced its own monitoring and evaluation
mechanisms in five provinces, apart from participating in the government’s monitoring and
evaluation frameworks. The policy influence of CSPR was reflected in the fact that most of its
inputs and suggestions for the PRSP and the FNDP were accepted by government and
incorporated into the final policies. (Matenga 2010: 68-70)
Most recently, CSPR participated in the formulation and monitoring of the SNDP, while also
publishing a simplified version of the development plan, an activity that was sponsored by
UNICEF, and the Embassy of Finland. In this document, it states that the Ministry of Finance and
National Planning is the government body who is responsible for the coordination of the
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the SNDP. It further states that “non-state actors”
will play an important role in M&E of government programs, in terms of undertaking their own
independent monitoring and evaluation and discuss findings through institutions like the Ministry
of Finance and the Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs). The SAGs have been an important arena for
the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the development policy processes of
the PRSP, the FNDP, and now the SNDP. They were established in 2003 as part of a more
inclusive institutional structure for monitoring the implementation of the PRSP. Originally eight in
number, they have been increased to twenty-two working groups that have a wide representation
of members of civil society organizations, government, academia, private sector, and cooperating
partners. (Matenga 2010:70-72) The criticism that has been levied at the SAGs from civil society
and academia suggest that the SAG’s are merely “window-dressing” with the civil society
representatives; they are present, but they are not heard.
Now that the stage is set, the next chapter analyzes the first side of what I have called the evaluation
capacity coin; building internal M&E capacity in civil society organizations and supporting a
professionalization through national evaluation associations.
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5. M&E in Zambia: External influences and internal challenges
This chapter examines the diffusion of evaluation to Zambia; the traveling M&E assemblage, and
some of the actors involved in building evaluation capacity in civil society. The concern is more
about understanding the process of M&E indigenization rather than determining whether some
end goal of a mature evaluation culture has been reached. This chapter is divided into two sections;
the first is concerned about evaluation capacity building in Zambian civil society organizations,
while the second discusses the professionalization of M&E mainly through national evaluation
associations, and perceptions on the current evaluation capacity among civil society actors.
5.1 “De-mystifying M&E” – building evaluation capacity
In the new aid regime, the actors in the developmentalist configuration have been greatly concerned
with what is termed capacity building, which Gould (2005: 69-70) has argued is not undertaken for
its own sake, but is embedded in the particular policy agendas of development actors; “The ‘pro-
poor poverty partnership’ has ushered in a new generation of demands for which capacity must be
created”. M&E capacity has become part of this aid policy rhetoric as a lack that needs to be
corrected, and the dissemination of such capacity is considered necessary for the process of poverty
reduction to continue. It also has a way of reaffirming the aid regime’s sacred values of modernity
and rationality. However, there are several problems inherent in this, one of which Gould has
identified as the “infinite improvability” of subjects that turns capacity building into an endless
project in itself. (ibid: 71) Another key challenge in capacity building that became evident in my
research, was what my informants identified as a need to “de-mystify” M&E. The specialists known
as “Evaluators” or “M&E Officers”, and the particular set of techniques known as evaluation
methods that have become so commonplace in the Western societies aren’t necessarily recognized,
and certainly not taken for granted, in other societies.
According to my informants, the perception of M&E that many local CSOs have in Zambia is that
it involves people driving around in fancy range rovers doing “monitoring”, and the CSOs don’t
have the resources to engage in that type of activity, and perhaps also don’t see the point. M&E is
locally perceived as going to a project site and “inspecting” or “checking up on” the work that is
going on, and this is not a task for just anybody; it has to be a specialist entitled “M&E Officer”.
One of my Zambian informants was working as an M&E specialist at one of the largest grant
making foundations in the country, Zambian Governance Foundation (ZGF), who also focus on
capacity building support for CSOs. The role of ZGF can be described as mediators or brokers –
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an intermediary actor who functions as a translator of the abstract global policy tasked with
enforcing new normative, “rational”, and administrative orders (see Mosse 2005: 20). Capacity, as
Gould has remarked, has an ordering power in which hierarchies of authority and expertise are
created, even if the skills that are passed on may also be used subversively (2005:71). As my
informant observed when discussing the inception of the foundation in 2009; “we realized that you
can give grants to projects – but projects don’t run themselves. So you do need to provide capacity
development support in addition to grants.” Upon further inquiry into how this work got started,
I was informed that;
You need organizations to have the ability to track the results of the work they do. You
need them to understand how to measure progress and to report on it, things like that.
So we started to develop toolkits and other kinds of support mechanisms. And in that
process it was necessary that we ourselves needed to have a strong monitoring and
evaluation system that helped us follow up, not only on what we were doing to support
them, but also on what they were doing in their various interventions; trying to influence
policy, trying to bring about change, trying to…build peoples’ confidence and a sense of
rights.
Capacity development can have the dual function of both disciplining and empowering (ibid.: 71),
and the quote above also illustrates the role of an actor like ZGF as both an object and an agent of
the global development regime. As they work to build M&E capacity in Zambian civil society
organizations, they are simultaneously subject to external pressure and the “ordering power” within
capacity; “We get grants ourselves, to be able to give grants to others, and we are constantly under
pressure to show; ‘what are these people even achieving? What change are they making? Why
should we continue to give you money so that you can give them money?’”. The above-mentioned
difficulty of making local CSOs understand how to use M&E and why, was an apparent challenge
in ZGF’s work, a challenge that can be framed in terms of creating an administrative order and a
single discourse on what “M&E” is about. It represents a core problem of indigenizing an
evaluation culture. Definitions of central concepts in the aid regime often diverge from the way
these concepts are understood and used in society at large or even in parallel expert domains (Gould
2005: 70). My ZGF informant explained the difficulties in the following manner;
I think for many of them [the CSO’s] it’s just a question of not thinking, not valuing it
enough. Just not appreciating what it does for me as an organization, as a person in my
job. They say ‘no but we don’t have an M&E officer here, so we don’t see why, or how
we can do monitoring and evaluation‘. I tell them, look, it’s not a question of someone
being called that in the organization, but everybody’s job could include elements of
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monitoring, because you have to be able to understand whether what you’re doing makes
any sense for anybody. Does it make a difference? Is there any use in doing more of the
same? How do you evaluate that what you’re doing really is the right thing to be doing, if
you don’t bother to monitor? And just, to look back and see, ‘has this really worked?’ I
think it’s just the appreciation which still is not there.
Any resistance towards evaluation as such is often viewed as irrational, coupled with egotistical
interests, or simply as the result of a lack of an evaluation culture (Dahler-Larsen 2012:164). So
how do the mediators of the global aid agenda handle this? One of the methods was mentioned
briefly in a quote above; the creation and distribution of an “M&E toolkit” for civil society
organizations engaged in governance and policy engagement work. This toolkit inform
organizations on the ins-and-outs of the M&E practice and emphasizes ZGF’s commitment to a
“culture of learning”, that is to be achieved through the implementation of an M&E system that
conforms to ZGF’s values of fairness, integrity, respect, quality and learning (ZGF 2011). It also
contains information on how to do M&E reports, tailored to suit the foundation’s needs (and no
doubt the foundation’s donors’ needs). Aside from this toolkit, a number of training workshops
for “grant partners” (the CSOs who go through the process of applying for grants and support
successfully), are organized on M&E as well as other administrative and fashionable areas.
ZGF also applied a strategy called “accompaniment”, which started out as “M&E accompaniment”
based on the identified difficulties in this capacity building area. This entails giving the CSOs who
are grant partners an M&E expert who walks with them in what my informant described as “the
process of developing really good systems of monitoring, really good indicators of measuring
change, and just developing the culture.” Because the foundation has been understaffed for a long
time, this is outsourced to consultants, “mostly” local experts on M&E who have been with the
foundation for a number of years and “are very aware of the kinds of things we’d like the partners
to develop, the kinds of support, the style in which we support, and all those kinds of things that
are important for us [ZGF].” It’s not unlikely that this accompaniment of an M&E expert works
to reinforce already formed perceptions of monitoring and evaluation as something carried out by
an external “expert” only. Although the foundation, according to my informant, does manage to
locate a few Zambian M&E experts even though the supply is described as “pretty thin” and the
list contains only two names (but can be extended to four people who can provide the basics).
Another one of my informants with no direct connection to capacity building efforts, postulated
that this capacity building seems to be more about matching an organization’s operation with the
donor’s criteria, sort of “swaying” the CSOs in the donor’s direction to report how the donor’s
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money is spent, rather than being about strengthening the projects and work that the CSOs are
doing. This is perhaps straying a bit far towards the “populist moralism” of the subaltern, if we
consider the productive side of power where most capacity builders and donors do seem to believe
in the universal good of evaluation. At ZGF, the M&E Specialist expressed her disappointment
over the poor results of evaluation capacity building in CSOs;
Sometimes when...lots of times...for some organizations when their grants run out, when
the grant duration period ends they have the opportunity to access another grant
depending on how well they’ve done with the first one. And so you expect that, at this
point they are going to design…the design of their project will be pretty easy, they will
have understood what we look for in M&E and they will have understood how to measure
and monitor projects and so on…and they’ve not.
An internalization of a meticulously formalized way of producing documents such as project
proposals or monitoring and evaluation reports is often considered a key indicator of improved
capacity (Gould 2005: 79). The lack of an indigenization of an evaluation culture results in a lot of
stress for the capacity builders – the mediators of the global aid agenda – who has to report back
to their donors higher up in the capacity building order. ZGF has taken a more direct approach to
this dilemma, and has started to collect the information they need from the grant partners (the
CSOs) by themselves.
A second challenge in evaluation capacity building is the sustainability issue. Building evaluation
capacity has been framed as a way of ensuring sustainability of local development interventions
(see Dahler-Larsen 2012) – although I argue that this is merely one side of the coin – but what
about the sustainability of the capacity building that is taking place? From my research, it became
apparent that it was difficult to institutionalize M&E within the organizations, and the capacity
builders ended up working mostly with individuals, which had obvious constraints, as my ZGF
informant explained:
There is a pretty high turnover in some of the civil society organizations […] and in most
cases you are working with individuals, because no matter how hard you try, some of the
skills never really get institutionalized. So you get one or two people that become really
good in the organization, and then they can easily be approached by somebody else
because they are good at that, and that’s the skill that many are looking for. This tends to
happen pretty often.
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Another one of my informants, the former chairman of an M&E association who has written about
M&E and development in Zambia, commented on the notion that it’s often the younger
population who are trained, but since they don’t yet have any families of their own, or any strong
bonds to the community, they tend not to return after they’ve been trained. By building capacity
among those who are already well-established in the community, my informant speculated, the
shortfall in M&E capacity in rural areas could possibly be remedied.
What has become obvious is that international policy regimes “do not simply arrive, but are
produced by intermediary actors” such as ZGF above, and frontline workers such as CSO staff
(Mosse 2005: 20). On the African continent, another mediator of the evaluation capacity building
and for creating and institutionalizing an “evaluation culture” is the African Evaluation Association
(AfrEA). This is the continental body for national evaluation associations in African countries, and
it has been spearheading the M&E capacity building in the region along with donors and
international coalitions such as EvalPartners. The AfrEA’s role as a mediator for capacity building
was however questioned by a former chairman of an evaluation association in Zambia; “All it did
was to concentrate on conferences, and within that two years, between conferences, the activities
were basically nowhere. They would have a conference, donors would pump in a lot of money,
everybody would talk about ‘capacity building, capacity building’, and once you leave the
conferences, the workshops, there’s no follow-up.” In the next section I will discuss some
evaluation capacity building efforts that has been carried out by one of Zambia’s evaluation
associations, along with the growth of a professionalization of M&E in Zambia.
5.2 The professionalization of M&E
“You literally knew all the M&E people in the country. You could count them.”
The history of M&E in Zambia is a relatively short one, but attention to the subject has rapidly
increased in recent years, as the diffusion of an evaluation culture has reached the so-called
developing countries. Professionalization is closely linked to the indigenization of a practice that
we might call an assemblage, and an indigenization of M&E in developing countries requires a
supply of “local” professional M&E experts.
Crewe and Harrison has discussed the tendency to fetishize technology in development
interventions, and the role of experts in this. They contend that technical expertise in development
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is often associated with expatriate advisers (of the male kind), and that divisions between Western
knowledge and indigenous knowledge is to a large degree entrenched in ideas about people rather
than “objective differences” in knowledge or expertise. The argument is that the “definition of
certain forms of knowledge as ‘expertise’ according to who has the knowledge, rather than because
of the nature of what is known, effectively excludes a wide range of people from the central
discourse”. (1998: 92) In some cases it would be part of the aid conditionalities that donors get to
bring in their own people, their own experts into the development projects. But since the new aid
regime, with a focus on ownership and partnership, along with the drive to build “national
evaluation capacity”, it would seem that there’s been a shift in the aid discourse on who is an expert.
As one of my informants from a local M&E association remarked; “The difference between the
expats from outside and the locals were that the expats from outside, though they knew the
theoretical parts and all that, they were very good theoretically, they didn’t understand the local
contexts. They didn’t have the local knowledge.” At the time when there was a recognized need
for local M&E experts, there weren’t any capacity to train them locally, which meant that Zambians
were being sent off to the UK, Germany, the United States, India or possibly South Africa to
receive training in M&E, and then return to work for donor agencies or the Zambian government.
In the beginning of the new century, money for M&E trainings in Zambia started to come in via
donors. The Centre for Disease Control was one such institution, where one of my informants had
found work as a Program Specialist but was also responsible for “strategic information” (which is
what CDC calls M&E), which meant that he also had some funding to set up local M&E trainings
for Zambians. Courses were set up at the University of Zambia, and M&E trainings were also held
for government officials. In the government agencies, however, trying to build capacity for M&E
is a lot more challenging than organizing a training course for students at a university;
One of the main challenges that we found is that, at the government level, you can have
so many systems running, and there’s so many ideas and new things coming up, that it’s
kind of destructive at the national level. You have so many donors on the playing field,
each one of them has ideas about what they want to fund and not fund, they talk to the
same Ministry, et cetera, so that’s where the challenges are.
My informant then shared a story on one such M&E training program, organized by himself and
a team, illuminating challenges in coordination and communication on government level;
So this program was designed because we have so many people who are practicing M&E,
and most of them, like we said, the skills are not there, there’s very few people who can
actually get a data set and analyze it […] So we started out the program, uhm…we wrote
out this nice curriculum and whatever, we trained people in the areas et cetera…;
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Somebody got the curriculum, and started off another program, another [donor] funded
program, and started training the same people on the same things! It was somebody in
the Ministry [of Finance]… ‘Oh, this is a nice curriculum, with all these shiny powerpoint
slides already made and all, this will be a good training’, and they started training and
calling the same people back for the same training.
When asked about their perceptions of the general M&E capacity in Zambia, my informants had
different opinions. The chairman of one evaluation association (same informant as quoted above)
said that there has been a huge improvement in the capacity compared to where they started and a
lot more local M&E practitioners, although the quality and skill level varies a lot. The ZGF
informant contended that; “if I give you our annual reports you will see that from 2012, we’ve been
saying that there’s a lot we can’t report on because the M&E capacity still is very low, the M&E
capacity is very low….until we had to stop saying that because we were sounding like a broken
record.” That there seems to be a growing number of Zambian M&E practitioners is likely
symptomatic of the recent drive within the development regime to build evaluation capacity,
whereas the reported low level capacity reflects the challenges in indigenizing an evaluation culture.
Recently, a study financed by DFID and carried out by the Centre for Learning on Evaluation and
Results in Anglophone Africa (CLEAR-AA, 2013: 32) assessed the demand and supply of
evaluation in Zambia. The study showed that “the supply of evaluation expertise in Zambia is
diverse in its quality and needs further development”. There is a demand for local M&E experts in
Zambia, but this demand is almost exclusively put forward by external development agencies and
to some degree civil society. The CLEAR-AA report showed that even the evaluations conducted
in the Ministry of Finance is contingent on external support from donors. In many cases when
local M&E experts are sought after for development evaluations, there’s often a foreign expert
leading the evaluation while the local M&E expert merely supplements, as described by my
informant; “what we have to know is that when an assignment is coming from outside, usually they
might just need one local person, because already they have identified who is supposed to be who,
outside.” Another informant confirmed this by stating that “You have a lot of foreign expats, you
can combine, you know, you have like one person who is leading the evaluation who’s an
international expat, with a local supporting.” In building evaluation capacity and supplying the local
M&E experts, evaluation associations, as we shall see, requires a closer examination.
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Local M&E Association(s)
“’Why do we always have to deal with both of you, why don’t you think about merging?’”
In any project of indigenizing a traveling assemblage or “package” such as M&E, professional
associations have a significant role to play. As shown in chapter two, the existence of M&E as a
profession with its own national association and a discussion on professional ethics is one indicator
of an evaluation culture (Furubo et al. 2002). Kosheleva & Segone (2013: 569) has remarked that
local M&E associations in Africa have the dual challenge of not just promoting quality evaluation,
but also the national demand for evaluations.
For quite a number of years, Zambia had two parallel M&E associations; Zambia Evaluation
Association (ZEA), and Monitoring and Evaluation Support Systems (MESSY), until they merged
in 2014, and at the time of writing this thesis they are in the process of registering the one and only
Zambia Monitoring and Evaluation Association (ZaMEA). The process and history up until this
point reflect the changes in national evaluation demand and supply, as well as the effects of changes
in international development policies and donor interests.
ZEA was donor-driven from the start, according to the former chairman, and has been running
for around ten years, while MESSY started out as a small group of M&E practitioners in the mid
90’s. People would get together at someone’s house, present their work, get feedback on an M&E
system they were setting up, or some advice on evaluation methodology. After some time, the
group began meeting more frequently and started to identify training needs or training areas, such
as in Participatory Rural Appraisal, or quantitative data analysis using STATA. Former MESSY
chairman and now the interim chairman for ZaMEA explains; ”[that] evolved into actual trainings,
we’d have very short trainings, we would have one week, two week trainings….and you know how
it is, over time people start saying ‘I’m a member of this group’, so then we had to give it a name.
So we called it support systems, like M&E Support Systems. A simple group of people who meet,
talk about M&E.” When MESSY got registered, ZEA was already established as an M&E
association, but with a different angle; to offer M&E consultancies. The main purpose was to put
forward the agenda of Zambian M&E professionals, which worked for some time. ZEA would
receive a quarter of the consultancy money coming in, and the rest would go to the individual
consultant performing the assignment. However, according to the former chairman, this soon
resulted in a fight over consultancies where a small network of people inside the organization
formed a link with those who gave out consultancy assignments. Some of the organizations’
37
members would benefit, while others would be left out. The offering of M&E consultancies,
intended to employ and nurture the local evaluation capacity, became a major challenge for the
association itself; “within the executive there was that split, with people feeling they were not
benefitting, and those who were benefitting.” Despite the struggles within the organization, there
was a recognized need at least among some practitioners to build up the internal M&E capacity.
The former chairman laid out his views in the following manner;
Instead of focusing on what we can get out of ZEA, let’s think of what we can give to
ZEA so that at least M&E can develop in Zambia, because the demand is so much, but
without a strong national association we will not be able to meet it. And we will not be
able to help government be able to move away from depending on donors and foreign
experts. We are here, at least if we developed the profession in Zambia, we can be offering
checks and balances, we can be the watchdogs of governance issues, national
development.
For Zambia, changes in the development landscape was brought about by the US launching of
PEPFAR (the President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief) in 2003 and had an unquestionable
impact on M&E in the country, and also on the evaluation associations. It brought in a lot of
funding, around $65 million in the first year, and thus was able to fund a lot of organizations that
needed M&E support. According to MESSY’s former chairman, this resulted in that: “[In] the first
MESSY meetings, most of the discussions were HIV/AIDS related, and almost all the trainings
that we did were on implementations of HIV/AIDS evaluations, data systems; almost everyone
who attended came from an HIV/AIDS program.” This is but one illustration of external
circumstances driving M&E in Zambia. In this case, it also meant that MESSY was able to get
funding from the National AIDS Council, who recognized MESSY’s role as an evaluation capacity
builder.
ZEA’s former chairman explained the difficulties of running a donor dependent organization by
referring to the changing priorities and interests of the donor agencies and its staff; “The person
who might have been keen on M&E might move away, the next person who comes in might not
be so keen. So that has been a major challenge, because of this in-and-out kind of thing of donor
agencies.” This made it difficult to build relationships and make connections with the cooperating
partners. In addition, the strategic plans of donor agencies would change from one time period to
the next, contributing to the financial insecurity. This was a time when donors would still engage
with organizations directly, and at that time, ZEA received support from UNICEF and the German
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). The former chairman brought up a
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different aspect of the lack of capacity; “When people were thinking of capacity building for
associations, they were just thinking of the skills to do M&E, but not how to run the organization.”
However, my informant, in pondering what ZEA’s capacity problems were about at the core, finally
conceded that “so we had those capacity challenges, administrational, financial, managerial…
basically it was mainly on the issue of money. Money to run ZEA.”
The two associations finally realized that they were moving in the same direction and had roughly
the same goals – even if the focus was slightly different – and after the Ministry of Finance grew
increasingly impatient about having to turn to both of them on M&E related matters, they have
now merged and formed Zambia Monitoring and Evaluation Association (ZamEA). The interim
chairman explained that this platform is crucial as it provides a coordinated research community
on M&E, and also works to build the M&E skills of existing practitioners and beginners. Marking
a difference in relation to the African Evaluation Association, he also stated that ZaMEA wants to
focus on both monitoring and evaluation, instead of just on evaluation which tends to be the main
agenda of AfrEA.
In concluding this chapter, having examined evaluation capacity building efforts and the
professionalization of M&E in Zambia to increase the supply of local M&E experts, it has become
apparent that the different capacity building mediators are taking different approaches and
adjusting to the social context in which they are working. The M&E association is concerned with
enhancing the skills level and bringing together a supply of local M&E experts – while ZGF tries
to convince CSOs that practicing M&E in their projects does not have to involve a person with
expertise knowledge entitled “M&E Officer”. Multiple sources have argued that development
agencies, both international and national bodies, have been the driving force in exporting an
evaluation culture to other countries, now in particular to developing countries (see Kosheleva &
Segone 2013, Toulemonde 2000, and Furubo et al 2002 above). What may have started out as
evaluation capacity building solely for the purpose of ensuring sustainability of development
interventions in local settings, has evolved into something much more complex and multifaceted.
Next, the other side of the evaluation capacity coin focusing on CSO-led monitoring and evaluation
will be analyzed.
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6. Accountability between state and citizens: CSO-led evaluation in
Zambia
This chapter focuses on the other side of the evaluation capacity coin in development; local civil
society organizations leading monitoring and evaluation of government service delivery in the
current aid architecture. In Zambia, this is performed by the civil society network, CSPR, which
will be at the center of analysis in exploring the means and challenges in realizing social
accountability. In the following sections, I will describe the evaluation methods used in the CSPR
project and relate it to the context in which it operates. The purpose is not to engage the reader in
a discussion on whether the methods or the knowledge that is produced are to be considered
“valid”, but rather how different forms of knowledge are produced and perceived by different
actors in this multifaceted project.
6.1 “Listening on the ground”: CSPR’s Barometer project
“It was important that it came from the community, therefore we now have their support, otherwise they would have
just said ‘no, you chose these people, you only work with them, not us.’”
The community monitoring and evaluation called the Barometer project, organized through the
CSPR, represents what Gildemyn (2013:147) would call “CSO-led M&E”, where civil society is
not involved in an official M&E system, but rather carries out M&E independently (beyond internal
evaluations of its own projects) and engages with government officials through other channels.
The project was set up in 2009, with the initial purpose of filling out a gap in feedback from
government spending, in particular in the Ministry of Finance as this is the lead agency in policy
implementation. According to my informant, they didn’t have a functioning M&E department at
the time, but whatever monitoring that was carried out by the government was focused on resource
disbursement in quantitative terms, and so funding was disbursed without any feedback on how
projects turned out, whereas the Barometer “brings out the qualitative aspect”. While numerous
tool exist for civil society, CSPR focus their efforts on four objectives; (1) Diagnostic – identifying
problems and their scope, (2) Monitoring – regular assessments to continuously check initiatives,
policies, or programs, (3) Evaluation – assessing whether an initiative, policy, or program has
achieved its intended results and outcomes, and (4) Dialogue – engaging citizens and communities
in informed discussions on shared priorities and goals. The Barometer project has two different
elements; budget tracking which involves following the allocation of funds to particular
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development areas and tracking evidence of the utilization of such funds in addressing
development needs, and service delivery monitoring that involves perceptions of government
services on provincial, district and community level and feedback from both service providers and
service recipients. (CSPR 2012: 34)
The budget tracking aspect is done in six sectors; health, education, water and sanitation,
agriculture, infrastructure development, and social protection. On community level, the budget
tracking is only performed in four sectors; agriculture, health, education, and water and sanitation,
as there is no social protection or infrastructure sector on that level; that is administered at national
level by the central government. The data collection for the Barometer report is usually carried out
twice a year, reporting results every six months, however, due to lack of funding it has only been
carried out once for 2013, and will only be executed once for 2014.
The methodology for the Barometer project involves questionnaires and budget tracking forms on
budget allocations and disbursements that are delivered to public service workers (key informants)
in the districts where CSPR are present. The methods also include community members who are
given scorecards, which are used in focus group discussions. A challenge in arranging the focus
groups is to keep the number down to around 15-20 participants per group. Even though more
participants would correspond with the inclusive and empowering approach to community M&E,
it does make the scoring a lot more difficult as more people has to come to an agreement on how
to rate government performance. The organization never turns anyone away, but encourages a time
limit for each issue that needs to be discussed. Scorecards are a common methodology used for
participatory monitoring and evaluation, and in this case, focus groups are organized in the
communities where the locals gather to discuss a certain number of issues per service delivery area
(the six sectors listed above) and grade it on a scale from 0 to 5 on a “Service Delivery Scorecard”.
Aside from giving each issue a score, the groups are also required to sum up the reasons for that
particular score. The focus groups in each community are divided into a male group, a female
group, and a youth group (if you’re under 35, you are considered youth). The focus group
discussion are usually conducted in the local language in the community in question. I interviewed
the Provincial coordinator for the Southern Province, who explained that the community members
themselves carry out the data collection, but the Research and Policy task force – consisting of
members from the Provincial program management team within CSPR – are responsible for the
coordination. In ten districts, community members are chosen to become “community facilitators”
and are trained from a rights-based approach to be able to hold government officials accountable
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for the kind of service delivery the community members are given. As my informant explained, in
identifying the community facilitators, CSPR went about it in the following manner;
The community knew about CSPR because we had been coming there to sensitize them
on various issues, so what we did was we organized a community meeting, open for
everyone, and said we are looking for people who want to be a part of this service delivery
and budget tracking. We explained we needed people who were going to be available
when we call, people who could do this monitoring even in their day-to-day activities, we
said ‘who do you think can help us?’, and the community members would discuss and
then give us a list of names. It was important that it came from the community, therefore
we now have their support, otherwise they would have just said “no, you chose these
people, you only work with them, not us”.
In finding the community facilitators, the requirement was also that they needed to be able to read
and write, and “it was crucial to have equal participation, we didn’t end up with exactly equal but
at least there is representation, in one of the communities there are actually more women than men,
and in the other there are more men than women.” When asked about how the community
facilitators were motivated to participate in the project, my informant said that “they were told that
they are volunteers, that this is for their own benefit and we wanted to see them empowered,
because even if CSPR is the one providing the monitoring logistics, they are doing it for themselves
and to improve their own community. We do give them t-shirts, books and files that they need for
the work, and identity cards, so that wherever they go, they are identified.”
In the Barometer report of July to December 2012, (this was the newest report finished at the time
of research since data collection for the entire year of 2013 was completed in February 2014), the
methodology also contained a panel of experts to whom the analyzed data from district and
provincial level would be presented. This panel, consisting of eight people from academia, the
private sector, civil society, retired government officials, and expats, would follow three steps in
their assessment; exchange information and create a common understanding, discuss evaluation of
the facts, trends observed, and primary data collected, and finally do their own scoring through
secret ballot from a scale of 0-100 % on how well the government has met each indicator.
Over the years, the methodology has been revised a number of times, which also relates to the fact
that the project has had different donors supporting different elements of the project. According
to my informant, one donor rarely funds the entire project, but rather a particular segment; the
research aspect, elements of training, elements of publication, and distribution of the findings –
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one donor usually supports only one process. The Zambian Governance Foundation has been
supporting CSPR since around 2009 when the Barometer project started, and the initial
methodology was developed with staff from CSPR and a consultant from DANIDA (DANIDA
has since phased out its support to governance in 2013), while DFID also supports elements of
the community monitoring project. In developing the initial methodology, I was told, the staff and
consultant would travel to the communities to find out what questions that were meaningful and
relevant to ask on a provincial and district level and what key issues was at stake for the community
members.
6.2 Creating a civil society watchdog?
CSO-led evaluation in the form described above has become increasingly popular as a demand-
side approach to accountability. (Gildemyn 2013:147) Demand-side accountability refers to the
abilities of citizens and civil society organizations to hold government accountable, whereas the
supply-side are the conditions that support governments’ ability to be accountable. Accountability
exists when those in power must justify and explain their actions, or are subjected to sanctions in
the event of power abuse. (McNeil and Malena 2010:4) In order to hold the government
accountable, knowledge must be produced. A sociological understanding of knowledge would
claim that “knowledge is whatever counts as taken-for-granted reality within a given social context”
A knowledge regime might carry with it a variety of unforeseen consequences, where new
knowledge can lead to social change, but hardly in a linear manner. This can be explained by
differences in power relations, value conflicts, and unintended consequences of earlier applications
of knowledge. (Dahler-Larsen 2012: 22-24) The emphasis in the Barometer project has increasingly
moved towards community participation and local knowledge, likely through the influence of
existing values in the new aid architecture.
The Barometer project started out from a rights-based approach (RBA), in which the focus is on
empowering people at the grassroots level by promoting basic human rights, a useful approach in
illuminating linkages between poverty reduction and issues of accountability and the recognition
of power relations (Lewis 2009: 59). As my CSPR informant put it, the rights-based approach is
used to inform community member that; “they have rights to clean water, proper education, and
if there are no meds at the health clinic, they have a right to know, why are there no meds.” McNeil
and Malena (2010: 192) have speculated that the “cultural characteristic” of respecting authority
and not questioning those in power poses a challenge to social accountability efforts such as the
CSO-led evaluation project described above, as seeking accountability from a public official can be
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seen as an act of disrespect. However, this was not supported in the data underpinning this thesis,
where informants instead pointed to a lack of information on where to demand accountability;
Sometimes it’s because of lack of knowledge, that’s why people may leave things as they
are, they don’t know where to report or they don’t know what action to take. So when we
are actually seeing the community beginning to speak and demand for these rights, I think
it’s a desirable situation that we want to see for the rest of the other parts of the country
[…] If the community is empowered they are able to know, this is meant for them, and
when I do this it’s not just for me, it’s for my children, it’s for the generation to come.
There is also the question of whether or not the CSOs are dealing with an “institutionalized” state
and a stable democracy. In discussing the challenges of NGO advocacy in relation to the
government, Lewis (2001:129-130) notes that the most difficult aspect is that of making the state
accept its responsibility for service delivery and welfare of its citizens; “the prevailing conditions
of debt, political, and bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency all combine to make even this basic
acceptance of responsibility a rather remote possibility”. For this reason, decentralization of power
and a strong democracy are considered important enabling factors for social accountability (McNeil
and Malena 2010:186).
One of my informants involved in evaluation capacity building contended that M&E methods used
by civil society needs to be very basic and straightforward – exemplified by the “food basket” which
is a comparison between basic goods and the take-home pay of Zambians, conducted by the Jesuit
Centre for Theoretical Reflection (CLEAR-AA 2013: 19). The methodology of the Barometer
project, as described above, is rather straightforward which makes a wide participation a lot easier
since not a lot of technical assistance is needed for the part of collecting the data. A CSPR staff
member described the procedure in the communities as follows; “So when we go in a district we
show them [the community members]; this is how much the government has allocated for you in
the education sector, in health sector, in social protection, and so on, but is it so? Did this money
arrive? And we’ve seen a lot of gaps, sectors that are really, really failing. Especially in the rural
areas.” As an example, we may take the health sector, where the community monitoring has
revealed situations where – due to lack of trained health personnel – drugs have been administered
and prescribed by security guards.
The participatory evaluation tradition emerged from the wider trend of participatory development
strategies in particular associated with Chambers (1994). Within this tradition, evaluation is viewed
in less objective terms and more as a “combined judgment” of different stakeholders. The
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criticisms levied at participatory approaches largely revolve around how easily they can be abused
or coopted into the top-down paradigm, and the risk that they may hide differences in power, and
the “conceptual contradictions” that can occur when distinctions are made amongst different types
of knowledge. (Lewis 2001: 135) With this in mind, the term “community monitoring and
evaluation” needs to be problematized. The role of civil society organizations, in this case CSPR,
cannot be underestimated in these efforts, as it is frequently civil society that initiates, organizes,
and mobilizes for social accountability (as exemplified in several case studies in McNeil and Malena
2010). However, as CSPR is funded by external donors, these also play a substantial role in how
M&E is used as a strategy and the design of “appropriate” methods.
The current methodology for the data collection on 2013 (for which the data was being “cooked”
during my field visit) had seen a significant change since the year before. My informant explained
that a DFID evaluation of the Barometer project’s methodology had led to two major changes in
the project. One is the way that data is presented in the Barometer report. The data would be
collected for the six different sectors mentioned, and then presented in six thematic areas; citizens’
participation and civic engagement in development processes, transparency and accountability,
pro-poor resources management and execution, basic service delivery and management, equity, and
human development. The DFID evaluation concluded that information should now be presented
according to sectors, the way the data was collected in the field. The second change was the removal
of the “panel of experts” that was described above. The informant at CSPR expressed
disappointment in this action, as the panel of experts would triangulate the data that was coming
in from the field and make use of documents such as the budget and the development plans, and
other sources in judging the governments’ performance; “I think the panel of experts had a
significant role to play in the barometer. However, it was felt that they kind of lost what the
communities had to say, because the communities give data according to sectors, but we presented
it according to thematic areas … But it was very important to include the panel of experts, although
we’ve done away with them.” The donor focus on community participation and ownership is
consistent with current trends in the new aid architecture, while only certain forms of “expertise”
are deemed appropriate. My CSPR informant, sighing over the non-involvement of the expert
panel, contended that “we are still trying to maintain a place for them, in terms of maybe, as trying
to validate the barometer, or present their own data, they can have a look at their own data and
look at the barometer”. The disagreement on the role of the expert panel might be construed in
terms of Long’s (2001) “battlefield of knowledge” in development, however, considering the
dependent role of CSPR on funding from DFID, there is an obvious imbalance on the field.
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Social accountability and knowledge utilization
As argued in chapter two, evaluations of any kind always produce knowledge, and the primary
purposes for community M&E are social accountability and feedback to those in power. This
section takes a look at the ways of disseminating knowledge and potential impacts of the Barometer
project. As remarked by Woolgar (2004: 6); “Knowledge is not an insight into the essence of things,
but a social accomplishment with uncertain consequences. Knowledge is ‘open-ended’ in the sense
that its ‘use’ is not an inherent property, but depends on the articulation, representation and
appropriation of knowledge in particular contexts” (quoted in Dahler-Larsen 2012: 25). Using
knowledge derived from community monitoring and evaluation of government-implemented
policy to bring about social accountability has its challenges, as “social accountability is about
relationships” and these relationships “among individuals, institutions and societal spheres – are
determined by a complex mix of political, social, institutional, cultural, and other factors” (McNeil
and Malena 2010: 185). The relationships that can form between citizens and CSPR on one hand,
and the service providers on district level on the other; has proven to be conducive in instances
where the service providers on district level cooperates with civil society to improve the service
facilities, and the delivery of services such as health care and water.
Gildemyn (2013:153) has argued that although CSO-led evaluations can lead to greater
accountability, “too many initiatives that support accountability are directed only toward
strengthening the answerability and transparency aspects, while forgetting the enforceability
dimension.” The ZGF informant commented in a similar vein on policy monitoring and evaluation;
“It’s not enough to only influence that the policy is shaped in a certain way, or that it is implemented
in some form, but it is also equally important to understand to what extent it has met its
expectations and to try and understand what worked well”. Enforceability in Gildemyn’s definition
refers to the ability to punish those in power and impose sanctions (ibid.: 147) – which naturally
poses a challenge for civil society who generally lacks this authority (on the other hand, for CSOs
who can bend the ears of donors, the picture might look different). What CSOs can do, however,
is to incentivize the government to take action by employing “soft” mechanisms such as media
exposure of development issues, informal dialogue and mobilization of public opinion (ibid.:152).
The CSPR strategies for disseminating the knowledge that is produced is tailored to different
audiences, as my informant explained; “Those who can read a 30 page research document – let
them have it; those who can read a flyer – let them have it; those who can read messages from a
poster – let them see it.” For every identified problem in service delivery, the information will be
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taken to the relevant government authority. Media channels and links throughout the network are
also used;
Simple reports have run, in community radio stations, this time around there is a lot of
glorification of community radio stations, so actually sometimes, depending on funds
available we are able to buy air time on these community radio stations where a problem
has been identified; a community member will feature on that program, we’ll even get
relevant authority that should improve the situation, and a civil society organization
working in that community to talk about that issue on air.
An example of informal dialogue is what CSPR refers to as “interface meetings” – corresponding
to Long’s (2001:191) use of the concept in his study of interfaces between peasants and bureaucrats,
where “interface” implies a face-to-face meeting between actors of different interests, resources,
and power. My CSPR informant explained these informal dialogues in the following manner; “We
also do what we call interface meetings, where we bring the local department heads of the six
sectors to the communities to answer questions that the people have, for example why are there
no drugs, or no books... and so far so good, we’ve seen some changes.”
What is particularly interesting in using a community M&E approach as a strategy is what Patton
(1997) has termed “process use” of evaluation, whereby not only the findings of an evaluation can
lead to outcomes, but the process of participation in M&E activities can have positive results such
as feelings of empowerment among community members in the CSPR case. Researchers have
proposed a shift in evaluation terminology and thinking from evaluation use to evaluation influence
in an effort to move away from the instrumental view and consider unintentional and long-term
effects of evaluation resulting either from the findings and/or the process. (Gildemyn 2013: 154)
The provincial coordinator at CSPR also explained how the community facilitators, if they notice
any changes in development, will come by her office and share the news, for example if a clinic is
renovated, or if there are suddenly desks at school, so it is continuous monitoring of government-
implemented development policy.
Engaging with the government on a national level takes an approach that one informant summed
up as “consistency with persistency”, in order to receive any attention and be able to organize
meetings where findings on the ground can be discussed, along with what actions will be taken.
The next section explores some of these challenges, framed in the cloths of power and legitimacy.
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6.3 Issues of power and legitimacy
“We go to the people who made the mess, and say ‘this is what we found’.”
This section discusses the interrelated issues of power relations and legitimacy concerns related to
CSO-led evaluation in general and CSPR’s Barometer project in particular. The questioned
legitimacy of CSOs involvement in M&E and the hierarchical relations of power between different
actors on the field have been considered the biggest challenges for these kinds of social
accountability efforts (Gildemyn 2013:152).
The political environment and the politics of evaluation
An enabling political context is deemed crucial for any accountability initiative, where a lot depends
on the political will, basic rights, and a decentralized power. (McNeil and Malena 2010: 186) As
noted by Chelimsky (2006), evaluation is a “fragile reed” up against the “giant oaks” of institutional
and governmental powers and structures, and persistent patterns of behavior (quoted in McKegg
2013: 580). Any evaluation activity, whether taking place in a development context or not, has a
political aspect where “controversy is in fact the rule rather than the exception” (Dahler-Larsen
2012:15). When discussing government reactions to CSPR’s M&E activities, my informant
commented that;
You see when you are doing civil society work, normally you get… uhm... antagonizing
from the government, because now they feel like “ok, you’re in Lusaka, what kind of
NGO is this that is going to advocate for people in Solwezi?3 How come the people in
Solwezi themselves are not saying what is bothering them, so why should you?”
Zambia has a history of distrust between government and civil society, and the former regime used
to label civil society organizations as opposing political parties if they were critical to the
government’s performance and accountability. These fears are still present among civil society
actors, as one informant explained;
You hear a lot of people expressing that there’s a lot of uncertainty around how your
results are received. And how what you feed to the government is perceived, you
know…are you perceived automatically as “oh, you’re supporting an opposition cause”,
because you say so and so hasn’t worked well. Or are you perceived to be pro-government
just because you say so and so has worked well.
3 Solwezi is a town in the North-Western province of Zambia, one of the poorest provinces in the country.
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For CSPR and their member organizations on district levels, the reception among local service
providers are rarely without suspicion, as exemplified in this quote from one CSPR informant;
I remember when we started budget tracking and service delivery monitoring in a
province called Luapula, Luapula is the most poorest in the country. When there used to
be tracking going on in the development sector, the nurse in charge was very apathetic.
He would allow people to come to the clinic, but he never wanted to be part of the
discussions that we call them, to do with health sector in that community. But he was very
shocked that, within a year or two, the community actually was able to advocate on behalf
of that rural health center that it should have a face lift. So that’s when this man walks in
to the meeting one day and says ‘you know, the time that I used to see you walking around
this place, I really used to feel, you know, [like] you’ve just come to police us.
Building the capacity for civil society to undertake monitoring and evaluation is intended to
influence public policy by giving society’s marginalized people a voice (Catsambas and others 2013:
44), but issues of representation often intervene in this neat chain of thinking. In trying to use
M&E as a strategy for accountability and pro-poor development, ensuring the CSOs own
legitimacy on community level is crucial for citizen participation. As Mumba (2014: 12) have
argued, “questions surrounding who CSOs are accountable to tend to work against them in
providing effective checks and balances and also in their attempt to influence public policy
debates.” There is an acknowledged lack of framework for how CSOs can be accountable to those
who they claim to represent – the intended beneficiaries usually have little insight into financial,
administrative, and decision making matters in the organizations. (ibid.: 6) In the Zambian context,
there is a flourishing of terminologies such as “Non-Governmental Individuals (NGIs)” and
“briefcase CSOs”, referring to individuals who claim to be working for public good but has formed
an organization solely for self-development (Elemu 2010: 20). The legitimacy of CSOs in
communities in many cases needs to be “earned”, as there is an initial skepticism among the
population about what the CSOs are actually doing, if it’s something that will benefit the
communities or not. As my ZGF informant commented; “very often you find that there tends to
be fatigue that arises, with seeing organizations going in, going out. And over time you don’t fully
understand what exactly do they do? What does it mean for me that they come here and do all
these things?” In building capacity for actors like CSPR to undertake monitoring and evaluation of
service delivery, ZGF has encouraged the collection of “stories of change” as a means to: “show
communities, ‘look, this is what’s possible with engaging in policy this way, this is what is possible
in doing service delivery work this way, and we’ve been able to tangibly measure, that because of
our intervention, this is what has happened.’ So it’s just about building legitimacy, and ensuring
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that it gives organizations the support base they need.” What was evident from interviews with
informants involved in the Barometer project was that district level change is much easier to
accomplish than any broader social change on higher levels. On national level, challenges remain
in accessing information, accessing the right officials to talk to, and finding out whether the CSOs
recommendations are taken into account or not. As the informant at ZGF remarked;
At the district level kind of engagement, you see a very different kind of picture, it’s much
more…of course the civil servants there feel they don’t have too much responsibility for
the overall governance, because it’s too centralized. They can sort of engage a bit more,
because they can say “oh, my boss in Lusaka is the one who has to make this decision”
[…] But it seems to be a much more fluid, much more open, much more engaging
relationship at the district level.
One CSPR informant claimed that, by now, the local government officials and service providers
know who the organization are and how they work, and gaining access to information is no longer
as difficult on the district level. Before going to the service providers, an introductory letter must
be issued from the Ministry of Finance, so that the service providers feel confident in that they are
allowed to release the information on development issues. However, as my informant remarked,
relations have now been developed between CSPR staff and the local officials, meaning that
sometimes information is released even without the letter from the central government.
Relationships between government officials on various levels and CSOs are critically important in
gaining access, and for accountability initiatives to have the slightest chance of bringing about
change. CSPR has gained a privileged position in this area compared to many other, smaller
organizations that are not part of the network. I spoke to one informant working for such an
organization, an all-women NGO called Society for Women Against AIDS (SWAAZ) with an
office in a quiet but rather run-down area outside Lusaka. The organization recently undertook a
monitoring project of their own, albeit in a much smaller scale, called the BMET (Budget
Monitoring and Expenditure Tracking). This involved gaining access to documents on budget
allocations, and then going to health centers in that area to interview patients, trying to discern
whether needs were being met and resources spent on its intended areas. As the informant
commented, gaining access to information from government officials is extremely challenging for
this small organization, and the political climate was described as not very conducive, once an
organization is labelled as being in opposition to the government.
Seeing as the demand (and funding) for evaluation in general, whether of service delivery or
national development plans, are largely externally-driven by donors rather than by internal forces
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(CLEAR-AA 2013: 32), donors are an influential part when CSOs are using evaluation as a strategy
for social accountability. One of my informants at CSPR touched on the balancing act that is often
required by the donors who support both the Zambian government and CSPR’s monitoring and
evaluation activities of public policy. When asked if the results of the Barometer project and similar
activities are delivered, not just to the government, but to the donors as well, he stated that;
Well, it’s a matter for the government, but the cooperating partners – that’s what we call
them now, we don’t say donors anymore; just semantics if you ask me, the relationship is
the same but the term has changed – sometimes we do invite them to disseminating
seminars. But there is a very fine line between politics and our operations, so sometimes
we have to balance on that line... But there have been situations where cooperating
partners ask for reports from us, and then they use them in their meetings with the
government agencies. But there are some diplomatic difficulties for them in using those
documents in meetings…
Naturally, if a donor is funding the activities, there is a need to report on what actions have been
taken. We can draw a parallel from this to a case study by Eyben and León discussed in Mosse
(2005: 19) that centers on a similar dilemma that arises for donors in the new aid architecture of
ownership and partnership. The question becomes one of “how do donors pursue their agenda of
social and political inclusion, good government and democracy while retaining the impression that
national governments are in control?” Eyben and León has shown how donors operate in complex
social networks to both maintain and conceal contradictions in the new aid regime, reliant on
vagueness and fragile alliances.
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7. Conclusions
The analysis above has examined the interlinking of evaluation and development through rather
abstract notions such as evaluation culture, capacity, social accountability, and global assemblages,
with an empirical account of evaluation capacity building efforts and CSO-led evaluation on the
ground in Zambia, which suggests that bold conclusions might be symptomatic of a case of hubris.
Nonetheless, we are able to draw certain conclusions about the main topic of the thesis. The recent
strive to build evaluation capacity in developing countries like Zambia can be framed, as I have
argued above, as the diffusion of an evaluation culture created – and now strongly embedded – in
Western societies. When understood in relation to the developmentalist configuration, a number
of different purposes emerge; (1) to increase national ownership of the development process, also
termed “indigenous management” (to a large extent a result of the Paris Declaration and Accra
Agenda for Action), (2) to increase accountability and reduce corruption (especially with the new
aid modality towards general and sector budget support), (3) to strengthen democracy and policy
making for pro-poor development, partly by supporting CSO-led evaluation. As noted in chapter
two, the sociologist Dalher-Larsen has pointed to a potential doubt in “progress” as a reason why
interest in evaluation has increased, whereas evaluation has been described as an important tool for
social betterment and a universal good, much like “development” itself, suggesting that evaluation
and development are forever locked in a “tango”.
Among the Zambian mediators of the global capacity building project, we’ve seen a flexibility on
the issue of “expert” knowledge and the need for M&E experts, adjusting to social context and
influenced by current values and trends. The means with which evaluation is used as a strategy for
social accountability are to a large extent contingent on the same values and trends purported by
the external donors supporting the CSOs. The power relations and legitimacy concerns that have
often been characterized as the biggest challenges do of course pose some obstacles for the social
accountability agenda, but in shifting the focus to evaluation influence instead of direct use, the
CSPR’s community M&E project has interesting potential in terms of a long-term outcome of an
active civil society that can be framed as social capital.
7.1 Further research
The indigenization process of a culture or “assemblage” can be analyzed and tracked in many ways.
When it comes to M&E, more research is needed into the local perceptions of what it entails,
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whether or not it is valued, and how it is used and transformed by local actors. Realistically, given
all the resources that are poured into building “capacity”, the sustainability of such capacity
especially in marginalized, rural areas need to be understood better.
As a complex and dynamic project, CSO-led monitoring and evaluation can be studied from a
variety of different perspectives. The effects of “soft mechanisms” for social accountability hasn’t
received much research attention. From a comparative approach, we might ask “how is M&E used
as a strategy by civil society in other countries?” This should include not only “developing”
countries but also societies in the “developed” countries. The recent shift towards evaluation
influence, encompassing more long-term effects of evaluation and participation in evaluation, could
also yield interesting findings and should be subjected to further inquiry.
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